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Abstract 
Australia's decision to provide tempo- 
rary safe haven protection to 4000 
Kosovars in response to the UNHCR 
request for assistance in their humani- 
tarian evacuation from refugee camps 
in surrounding countries, required 
quick action by the government to pro- 
vide for an unprecedented legislative 
and service delivery framework. This 
paper looks at the notion of temporary 
protection, both in international and 
specifically Australian context, before 
describing and assessing the legislative 
and service delivery mechanisms that 
facilitated Australia's response. This 
paper concludes that the risk of selec- 
tive intepretationof the legislation and 
the denial of democratic rights to the 
subjects of legislation, and the less than 
adequate service delivery to the 
Kosovars, and the arguable breach of its 
international obligations, suggests that 
Australia will have to think twice before 
engaging in such a mechanism in the 
future. 
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Introduction 
The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia from 
24 March 1999 triggeredamass exodus 
of refugees from Kosovo. In response to 
a request by the UNHCR, Australia 
agreed to accept 4000 refugees on a tem- 
porarybasis. The decision to accept the 
Kosovars required quick action by the 
government to provide for a legislative 
and service delivery framework, un- 
precedentedin Australian history. This 
paper looks at the notion of temporary 
protection, both in an international and 
specifically Australian context, before 
describing and assessing Australia's 
response to the Kosovar crisis. 
The International Experience Of 
Temporary Protection 
Article 1(A)2 of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees de- 
fines a refugee as a person who, owing 
to a "well founded fear of persecution 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion, is outside the coun- 
try of his nationality and is unable, or 
owing to such fear is unwilling to avail 
himself of protection of that country; or 
who, not having anationality and being 
outside the country of his former ha- 
bitual residence, is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to return to it." 
In accordance with this definition, 
the Convention only provides a right to 
seek asylum, not a right to be granted 
asylum. However Article 33(1) of the 
Convention provides for the right of 
non-refoulement, which expressly pro- 
hibits the receiving state from expelling 
or returning a refugee to the frontier of 
territories where his or her life or free- 
dom would be threatened, on the basis 
of race, religion, nationality, member- 
ship of a particular group or political 
opinion. Thus although a refugee is not 
guaranteed permanent entry into a 
country of asylum, that country is pro- 
hibited from returning the asylum 
seeker to a state where his or her life 
would be in danger. 
This principle of non-refoulement is 
one of the central notions of refugee law, 
and one that State signatories to the 
Convention are bound to abide by. How- 
ever, the practical realities of increased 
numbers of refugees and the continuing 
anti-refugee sentiment at a domestic 
level in many countries, have forced 
governments to try and compromise 
between the needs of their constituents 
and their international obligations. One 
of these compromises has been the de- 
velopment of the notion of temporary 
refuge. 
Temporary refuge might be summa- 
rised as emergency admission on a pro- 
visional basis, solely with the aim of 
providing a safe haven, without com- 
mitment concerning permanent or long- 
term refuge in a country of refuge.' In 
simplest terms, temporary refuge means 
a prohibition on forced repatriation so 
long as conditions in the country of ori- 
gin remain unsafe. 
Within this context, protection is 
linked with the persistence ofthe causes 
of protection. The Convention reflects 
the temporary nature of refugee status 
in the cessation clauses of article lC, 
especially paragraph 5.2 The concept of 
temporary refuge, thus stands as the 
linkbetween the peremptory, normative 
aspects of non-refoulement and the con- 
tinuing discretionaryaspect of a State's 
rights in a matter of asylum as a perma- 
nent solution, and in the treatment to be 
accorded to those admitted.3 
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The first granting of temporary ref- 
uge was granted in 1936 when France 
and Britain provided safe haven to per- 
sons fleeing the Spanish Civil War, for 
the duration of the conflict. Further his- 
torical examples include the temporary 
asylum offered for approximately nine 
months in November 1956 by Austria 
andYugoslavia to 200,000 persons flee- 
ing the unsuccessful uprising in Hun- 
g ~ . ~  In 1968 Austria again offered a 
similar type of temporary asylum to 
people fleeing the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. 
The conceptualisation of the term 
however, came about only in the 1970s 
with the Vietnamese Boat People Crisis. 
The first mention in official documents 
comes in Conclusion 15 of the UNHCR 
Executive Committee in 1979, which 
was concerned with the reception of the 
Boat People incoastal States5 The Ex- 
ecutive Committee stressed the humani- 
tarian obligation of coastal states "to 
allow vessels in distress to seek haven 
in their waters and to grant them asy- 
lum, or at least temporary refuge", to 
protect those on boardseeking it.6 Simi- 
larly, it noted that incases of "large scale 
influx, persons seeking asylum should 
always receive at least temporary ref- 
uge" and that states "faced with a large 
scale influx should as necessary and at 
the request of the state concerned, re- 
ceive immediate assistance from other 
states in accordance with the principle 
of equitable burden  har ring."^ 
At its 31"sessionin 1980, theExecu- 
tivecommittee affirmed the need for the 
"humanitarian legal principle of non- 
refoulement to be scrupulously ob- 
servedin all situations of large influx". 
At this point, the Executive Committee 
stressed the exceptional character of 
temporary refuge, and recognised that 
temporary refuge needed defining and 
further e~amining.~ In 1981 the Com- 
mittee adopted the substantive contents 
of temporary refuge, stressing in par- 
ticular the need for states of first refuge 
in situations of mass influx to grant 
admissions to their territory, preferably 
onapermanent, but at least ona tempo- 
rary baskg T,he High Commissioner 
further noted that there has been a "clear 
recognition that persons to whom only 
temporary asylum can be granted 
should be treated according to basic 
minimum standards."1° The High 
Commissioner in 1985 identified tem- 
porary refuge as being encompassed 
within the "universally recognised" 
principle of non-refoulement." 
The language of temporary protec- 
tion re-emerged recently in response to 
the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. As 
part of the "comprehensive response" 
temporary refuge was considered a 
"flexible and pragmatic means of af- 
for- needed protection to large num- 
bers of people fleeing human rights 
abuses and armedconflict ... who might 
have otherwise overwhelmed asylum 
procedures."12 A 1992 statement by 
UNHCR put its position as being that 
"persons fleeing from the former Yugo- 
slavia who are in need of international 
protectionshould be able to receive it on 
a temporary basis."13 
Despite this, the Executive Commit- 
tee of the UNHCR has so far stopped 
short of expressly endorsing the institu- 
tion of temporaryrefuge. This is aresult 
of a mixture of terminological squabbles 
and concerns that the formalisation of 
State practice in granting temporary, 
rather than permanent refuge "might be 
counter productive in 'legitimising' at- 
titudes of lesser, rather than greater ef- 
fort on the part of States in the provision 
of protection to persons in need." l4 
The common practice of temporary 
refuge, has in fact, led some commenta- 
tors to call the notion of temporaryref- 
uge a customary norm of international 
law, despite the absence of official en- 
dorsement by the UNHCR. Such law 
commonly fills gaps created where ac- 
tual situations diverge from what is cov- 
ered by existing treaties. It has been 
argued that the development of the no- 
tion of temporary refuge typifies this 
phenomenon of norm creation, and is in 
fact an acceptable practice.15 
Temporary protection thus serves 
three purposes: Firstly, administrative 
and economic resources are saved 
through the absence of a full asylum 
procedure assessing the individual 
claims, by applying a prima facie group 
determination. Secondly, politically, it 
becomes easier to return the refugee if 
the situation in the country of origin 
changes. In this way, a signal is sent to 
the refugee that their stay in the host 
country is temporary. Lastly, a signal 
is sent to the public at large that this 
refugee situation is purely a matter of 
protection with no element of volun- 
tary migration.16 
Australia's Experience Of 
Temporary Refuge 
Australia acceded to the Refugee Con- 
vention on 22 January 1954 and the 
1967 Protocol on 13 December 1973. 
The terms of the Convention and Pro- 
tocol are incorporated by reference into 
Australian law by section 36 of the Mi- 
gration Act (1958) which provides for 
a class of protection visas and applies 
the Convention definition of refugee to 
such status determination. The Aus- 
tralian government, like many others, 
has determined that in certain cases, 
temporary refuge, (usually imple- 
mented by the creation of additional 
classes of temporary visa) is the best 
means of simultaneously fulfilling its 
international obligations and appeas- 
ing an increasingly disconcerted pub- 
lic. 
Over the years, Australia has seen a 
number of temporary visas granted to 
people already in Australia who, were 
unable to return to their home coun- 
tries, such as Iraq, Lebanon and Sri 
Lanka. Then, as a result of the tragic 
events in Tienanmen Square in 1989, 
four-year temporary visas were 
granted tothe affectedChinese in Aus- 
tralia at the time, with these later being 
converted to permanent visas. In each 
of the above cases, the granting of the 
visas served many practical purposes, 
including the desire to regularise the 
status of people whose return would 
be difficult and to reduce pressure on 
refugee status determination proce- 
dures.'' However, it was not until the 
events in the former Yugoslavia and 
thenKosovo that the notionof tempo- 
rary refuge gained prominence again, 
and resulted in the development, im- 
plementation and execution of a new 
legislative framework for temporary 
protedion. 
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The Legislative Framework 
The creation of a temporary protection 
visa for the Kosovars tookthe concept of 
temporary protection to a new Austral- 
ian league. It differed from all previous 
applications in many fundamental 
ways. This was the first time that such 
visas were granted to people outside 
Australia; the Australian Government 
arranged and funded their travel to 
Australia; and all basic needs were pro- 
vided for while residing in the Safe 
Haven sites. This section of the paper 
seeks to provide an overview of the 
Australian legislative framework cre- 
ated in response to the Kosovar crisis, 
while the following section provides an 
evaluation of the legislation in the con- 
text of Australia's international obliga- 
tions. 
The Migration Legislation Amend- 
ment (Temporary Safe Visas) Act 1999 
(Commonwealth) ("the Act") provided 
this new legislative framework. The leg- 
islation created a new subdivision of 
the Migration Act 1958 (Common- 
wealth), introducing into it far reaching 
provisions which have been criticised 
for limiting the rights of those granted 
protection. Notably, the Actwas passed 
unanimously, with the support of the 
Labor Party, the Democrats and Greens 
as well as independent Senators 
Harradine and Coulston. In fact, one of 
the pre-conditions of entry for the 
Kosovars was that Parliamentary oppo- 
sition parties agreed to the passage of 
retrospective legislation to formalise 
theselirnitati~ns.'~ Section 4 of the Act 
therefore states that an application 
made before the commencement of the 
Act "ceases to be valid" on the Act's 
commencement, "despite any provi- 
sion of the Migration Act or any other 
law." In order to "avoid doubt", section 
4 states that this rule applies even if the 
application is the subject of a review or 
appeal to "areview officer, body, tribu- 
nal or court ." 
Under the Act, the Minister has a 
wide discretion to, by notice in the Ga- 
zette, extend or shorten the period of a 
safe haven visa. A visa may be short- 
ened if "in the Minister's opinion, tem- 
porary safe haven in Australia is no 
longer necessary for the holder of avisa 
because of changes of a fundamental, 
durable and stable nature in the country 
concerned." However, in this case, the 
Minister also has a power, which must 
be exercised personally, to exempt safe 
haven visa holders from removal, "if the 
Minister thinks it is in the public inter- 
est". 
There are also provisions that render 
invalid any application for a different 
class of visa after the enactment of the 
Act. Section 91K provides that if the 
holder of a safe haven visa applies, or 
purports to apply for avisa other than a 
temporary safe haven visa, then "that 
application is not a valid application". 
The Australian government claimed 
that such an approach ensured that 
Australiacouldmeet its commitment to 
provide temporary safe haven and also 
effectively maintain the integrity of 
Australia's migration and humanitar- 
ianprogra~nmes.'~ Section 91H that ex- 
plains that "the Parliament considers 
that a non-citizen who holds a tempo- 
rary safe haven visa, or who has not left 
Australia since ceasing to hold such a 
visa, shouldnot be allowed to apply for 
a visa other than a temporary safe haven 
visa." 
Assessment of Australia's 
Treatment 
Australia's treatment of the Kosovar 
refugees was surrounded by contro- 
versy from the outset. The Howard gov- 
ernment had initially ruled out taking 
any Kosovars at all. However, this 
stance was dramatically reversed when 
Cabinet met on 6 April and formally 
decided to admit 4000 refugees in re- 
sponse to arequest from the UNHCR. In 
real terms, the announcement came af- 
ter the US unveiled plans to place 
Kosovar refugees on the US naval base 
in Cuba and urged its NATO partners to 
make similar provisions. Just four days 
later, the Howardgovernment froze its 
offer to take4000 people, whenNATO's 
Europeanmembers objected to the US 
inspired airlift scheme, fearful that it 
would strengthen the hand of the 
Milosevic government in Yugoslavia. 
Finally, three weeks later on 1 May, the 
Australiangovernment re-activated the 
offer, again following an overnight re- 
quest from the UNHCR. 20 
There has been much speculation as 
to whether Australia properly fulfilled 
its international obligations with the 
enactment and implementation of the 
new Act. Article 34 of the Convention 
provides that states shall facilitate the 
naturalisation of refugees. This sug- 
gests that states have an obligation to 
look for a durable solution for refugees, 
which may include settlement of refu- 
gees within their territorie~.~~ The Aus- 
tralian legislation however, seemed to 
be motivated by a desire to discourage 
the Kosovars from seeking to remain in 
Australia. The inability of people 
granted temporary protection to apply 
for permanent protection, and the "in- 
validation" of any applications made 
priortothe enactment of the legislation, 
suggests that the Australian govern- 
ment acted in breach of its international 
obligations in this respect. 
The fact that the legislation prohib- 
ited the application by the safe haven 
visa holders, for a different visa, includ- 
ing a protection visa which would pro- 
vide them with permanent status, was 
subject to much criticism. A statement 
by UNHCR's Director of the Division of 
- International Protection in reference to 
Australia's Safe Haven legislation, re- 
inforced these criticisms: 
At law, the Convention cannot be 
made unavailable for persons for 
whomit was intended, even while its 
application can be delayed. Put an- 
other way, temporary protection 
arrangements should be applied 
without prejudice to the grant of refu- 
gee status to be entitled, where it is 
necessary to ensure protection 
against continued threat.2z 
Further, the addition of section 5OOAto 
the Migration Act was seen as under- 
mining Australia's humanitarian com- 
mitment. This section empowered the 
Minister torefuse or cancela temporary 
safe haven visa, and to exempt such 
decisions from the requirements of pro- 
cedural fairness and other grounds for 
legal challenge. This arguably breaches 
Article 16 of the Convention, which 
states that refugees shall have access to 
the courts. There are vague and sweep- 
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ing provisions in the legislation, which 
entitle the Minister to refuse or cancel 
visas on grounds such as: bad charac- 
ter, criminal conduct, having an asso- 
ciation with other suspected of criminal 
conduct, harassment, intimidation, 
molestation or stalking, vilifying others 
or inciting discord, representing a "dan- 
ger to the Australian community." 
Thus, these safe haven visas could be 
denied or cancelled on grounds of "na- 
tional security" and "prejudice to Aus- 
tralia's international relations". The 
Minister only has to be of the opinion 
that "there is significant risk" of detri- 
mental conduct. That is, no actual mis- 
conduct needs to take place. This raises 
the danger of therefugees' interests be- 
ing subordinated to the Australian gov- 
ernment's relations to the foreign 
countries.23 
Moreover, the rules of natural justice 
are excluded from the Act. In making his 
decisions, the Minister "does not have a 
duty to consider" whether to exercise 
any power, whether requested to do so 
by the non-citizen or any other person 
"or in any other circumstances". Al- 
though the Minister must notify the 
applicant of any decision relating to his 
or her status, failure to do so does not 
affect thevalidity of the decision. Refus- 
als and cancellations automatically 
apply to applicant's immediate family 
members, even if the latter are not noti- 
fied of the decision. These measures 
seem designed to prevent applicant's 
children, including any children newly 
born in Australia from acquiring any 
rights to stay.24 Further, a decision to 
refuse to grant, or to cancel a temporary 
safe haven visa is not a "reviewable 
decision"- there is no right of appeal to 
the Refugee Review Tribunal, Migra- 
tion Review Tribunal or the Federal 
Court. 
In fact, Ms Graydon a member of the 
Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee that considered the legisla- 
tion, expressed her doubts about these 
provisions: 
We are concerned at the notion of 
temporary asylum here in Australia. 
We are concerned that to accept a safe 
haven visa people forfeit in the proc- 
ess many of their rights in terms of 
that visa being covered by rule of 
law. We are concerned that it may be 
a precedent that leads to changes in 
the way asylum processes happen 
here in Australia. We are concerned 
that it may well constitute a breach of 
international obligations under the 
Refugee Convention and the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights. All 
of those concerns remain well in- 
tactz5 
However, it was not just the govern- 
ment's legislative framework that was 
subject to criticism. The treatment of the 
Kosovars, during the period of their 
stay, in terms of the standard of accom- 
modation provided, the quality of serv- 
ice delivery, as well the various 
prohibitions on work rights and medi- 
cal attention has also been criticised as 
breaching the spirit (if not the word) of 
the Convention. 
Article 7 of the Convention states that 
refugees should be accorded at least the 
same treatment as is accorded aliens 
generally. Article 17 of the Convention 
provides that states shall accord to refu- 
gees lawfully within their country the 
most favourable treatment accorded to 
nationals of the country in relation to 
the right to work. Chapter IVmakes simi- 
lar provisions regarding housingz6 , 
public educationz7 and social secu- 
rity2" 
The "safe haven" sites chosen for the 
refugees - disused and semi-used mili- 
tary barracks, usually in remote loca- 
tions, was insensitive and clearly did 
not constitute the same treatment as is 
accorded aliens generally. Sending 
traumatised victims of war to military 
bases, isolated from the Albanian com- 
munities provoked criticism from the 
Ethnic Community Council of NSW 
and the Australian-Albanian Associa- 
tion. 29 The poor conditions at one site - 
the Singletonmilitarybase, 230 kilome- 
tres north of Sydney, led three busloads 
ofrefugees torefuse todisembark on 14 
June. They objected tothe lack of toilet 
and bathroom facilities, inadequate 
heating and protection from the 
weather, and the absence of privacy for 
family groups.30 
Further, none of the Kosovars was 
entitled to Medicare benefits, or any 
social security. The government empha- 
sised that the provision of clothes, 
meals, health care, counselling and 
schooling was confined to the bar- 
racks. Those who wanted to live inde- 
pendently only received $20 per week 
for living expenses per adult, plus $5 a 
child (this was increased to $27 and 
$10 respectively on 1 June 1999). On 30 
June, theMinister announced that the 
refugees could only work a maximum 
of 20 hours per week, but would then 
lose their allowances. 
Moreover, the manner in which the 
Kosovars were returned to Kosovo con- 
stitutedafailure by the Australiangov- 
ernment to abide by its international 
obligations. In July 1999, the UNHCR 
assessedthe situation in Kosovo as be- 
ing secure enough for most of the 
Kosovar evacuees to return home. 
Having regard for the extra difficulties 
likely to be encountered by people re- 
turning to the Kosovar winter, the Gov- 
ernment made available a winter 
reconstruction allowance of $3000 per 
adult and $500 for each child under 18 
for those who returned to Kosovo be- 
tween 31 August and 30 October 
1999.~' On 18 October 1999, the Minis- 
ter told the House of Representatives 
that he would extend the deadline to 
November 30, but "if people remain in 
Australia after their visas have ex- 
pired, there is an obligation upon my 
Department to detain them and to re- 
move them from Au~t ra l i a . "~~  
This policy breaches the 
refoulement principle enshrined in 
Article 33 of the Convention. Despite 
the government's rhetoric and pur- 
ported evidence to support the return 
of the Kosovars, welfare groups and 
non-government organisations claim. 
ed that many Kosovars would be 
placed at riskif returned. Those at risk 
included: ethnic minorities and peo 
ple from mixed marriages; draft agc 
males who could have been consid. 
ered to have evaded KLA conscription 
people who could be perceived as hav, 
ing supported the Serb regime; femalc 
headed households without male sup 
port; people from areas in which ethnic 
Albanians are a minority, including 
southern Serbia; and victims of ex. 
treme violence.33 
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Despite this, return was justified by 
the Minister on the basis of the under- 
takings of the Kosovars who said they 
would return. However, these under- 
takings were signed at a time that the 
NATO offensive was still underway 
and there was no clarity about the future 
shape of Kosovo nor about any potential 
risks upon return. Irrespective of this, 
the Minister and Department insisted 
on the Kosovars return. By the begin- 
ning of April, there were 498 Kosovars 
left in Australia. ImmigrationMinister 
Ruddcokextended further protection to 
130 Kosovars, mainly for medical rea- 
sons. He also found that 110 could ap- 
ply for protection visas and two for 
partner visas on the basis of having a 
partner in A ~ s t r a l i a . ~ ~  The remaining 
259 were returned to Kosovo in mid 
International Comparison 
UNHCRmade its request for assistance 
to 30 countries around the world, each 
with various ties to the Kosovar refu- 
gees. It is interesting to compare the ex- 
perience of the Kosovars in Australia 
with other Western countries. Of the 
7300 Kosovars evacuated to Canada, 
either under the Humanitarian Evacu- 
ation Program or the Family Reunifi- 
cation Program, over 5000 remained 
and became eligible for residency sta- 
t ~ . ~ ~  Approximately one in three of the 
14,300 Kosoyars who came to theunited 
States returned home under theUS gov- 
ernment's funded return program, 
while the rest remain.37 In contrast to 
the generous US and Canadian experi- 
ence, Germany's treatment of the 
Kosovars has been less than favourable. 
Most of the 170,000 Kosovar refugees 
remaining in Germany and who refused 
aUS$1000 incentive toreturn, have ap- 
pealed against the expulsion decision 
made against them.38 However, the 
German government still insists on hav- 
ing them all returned by the end of the 
year. In Switzerland, around 30,000 
Kosovar refugees were affected by the 
deadline of 31 May 2000 to leave. Nearly 
19,000 accepted financial incentives to 
return home by the end of last year. Of 
the more than 4,000 refugees who 
signed up for a second phase of the vol- 
untary program, around 1,600 have so 
far gone back as of April this year. 39 
Some 10,500 remaining in Switzerland 
will be forced to return in the latter half 
of 2000. 
The various responses to the Kosovar 
crisis indicates the extent to which inter- 
national burden sharing and co-ordi- 
nation is limited by domestic 
requirements and public opinion. The 
European Council on Refugee and Ex- 
iles, the peak non-government organi- 
sation in Europe, has recently 
developed a complimentary policy in 
temporary protection. The main points 
of their policy include the notion that 
temporary protection represents a rea- 
sonable administrative policy only in 
an emergency situation where indi- 
vidual refugee status is not immediately 
practicable and where temporary pro- 
tectionwill ensure admission to the ter- 
ritory. Further, it should not be applied 
inanywaythat erodes existingforms of 
protection, such as theconvention. The 
rights afforded should include, as a 
minimum, the right to family unity, edu- 
cation, social assistance to cover basic 
needs health care, engagement in gain- 
ful employment, identity documents as 
well as explanation to both refugees and 
citizens of the host state of how these 
rights might be exercised. 40 
Conclusion 
There is no question that it is difficult to 
create a policy which simultaneously 
allows thosegranted temporaryprotec- 
tion to live a fruitful life in the country of 
asylum, and which keeps the indi- 
vidual asylum seeker's mind open to the 
possibility of returning home. Austral- 
ia's experience with the Kosovar refu- 
gees was problematic in a number of 
regards and arguably breached its inter- 
national obligations. The questionable 
nature of Australia's actions poten- 
tially places the concept of temporary 
protection in international disrepute. 
There is now a question of whether 
Australians would be willing to act in 
this manner upon UNHCR's request in 
the future, and whether the Australian 
public would support temporary pro- 
tection as enshrined inthe Act, given the 
scope for selective interpretation and 
the denial of democratic rights that it 
provides for. 
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